Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), unveiled by China’s President Xi Jinping in 2013, stands as one of the most ambitious and debated international initiatives. Propelled by an unparalleled scale of economic, political, and strategic vision, the BRI encompasses an intricate web of overland and sea-based routes, linking over nearly 150 countries. Presented as a comprehensive infrastructure program to facilitate global connectivity, trade, and development, the BRI’s significance extends beyond its economic dimensions.

At its core, the BRI is designed to construct vital links through roads, railways, telecommunications, energy pipelines, and ports across Asia, Europe, and Africa. This colossal initiative is comprised of linking the historical trade routes and ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese Dream’ the embodiment of Xi’s political ideology echoing nationalistic narrative in China that reflects a monumental effort to enhance connectivity and showcase influence to reshape international relations and the global order.  

Initially introduced as One Belt and One Road (OBOR), the concept had its roots unveiled during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013. The term ‘Belt’ in OBOR denotes the Silk Road Economic Belt, which revives the traditional trade routes connecting Europe and Asia through Central Asia. Subsequently, during Xi’s visit to Indonesia in October 2013, the ‘Road’ was introduced as the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. This aspect aimed to establish sea trade routes along the historic Marco Polo route, linking China to Southeast Asia, Africa, and Europe. The culmination of these initiatives occurred with the promulgation of the Action Plan for the One Belt One Road Initiative on March 28, 2015. This marked a pivotal moment, solidifying the One Belt One Road Initiative as the cornerstone of China’s foreign policy and economic strategy.

President Xi’s ambitious vision goes beyond physical infrastructure, extending to digital technology, health, and environmental projects. The BRI’s magnitude is underscored by its incorporation into the Chinese Communist Party’s constitution in 2017, reflecting its integral role in China’s long-term strategy for economic prosperity and geopolitical significance. 

Over the span of a decade, China’s investment in infrastructure development in emerging economies has exceeded USD 1 trillion, as reported by the Green Finance and Development Center and the Griffith Asia Institute. A significant share of this funding has been allocated to conventional infrastructure projects, such as roads, railways, and energy.

However, BRI has become a contentious topic, questioning its true motivations and potential consequences. As the BRI unfolds, it has become the subject of critical scrutiny and diverse perspectives- economic, security, political and strategic. Concerns range from environmental impacts to debt issues for participating countries, and a suspicion that the initiative may serve as a vehicle for China’s broader geopolitical ambitions.

Narrative of Security Strategy and Debt-trap Diplomacy 

A decade of BRI, the narratives on BRI have created a buzz in the international domain. Set by the Western world specially the US and its allies frame it as security and geo-political strategy and debt trap in the developing world where the projects have been launched. Different research and media reports tend to support these narratives however, alternative narratives regarding the issues create least discourse in the public domain. 

According to a report on Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative published by Asia Policy Society Institute concludes that commercial investments under the BRI in port infrastructure and digital advancements, play a direct role in advancing China’s status as a formidable maritime power, though it is portrayed as an economic and developmental initiative the approach involves integration of military struggle with political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and legal endeavors to create a strategic environment conducive to China. The report further indicates that many of the infrastructure projects designed under BRI are designed to use for dual purpose to enhance potential military and intelligence capabilities. Among such strategic purpose projects such as the port-park-city model for example industrial park in Minsk Belarus, Hambantota port in Sril Lanka and Djibouti in Africa; further Digital Silk Road seeks to assist in improving telecommunications networks, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, e-commerce, surveillance technology, and BRI space Information Corridor as communication remote sensing, navigation satellites with space based information resources and ground information sharing network. 

Moreover, reports have focused on Sri-Lanka as a case to create a narrative on China’s debt trap diplomacy. The Hambantota Port construction began in 2008 and was funded through Chinese loans. A report on ‘Chinese debt trap diplomacy: reality or myth?’ published in Taylor and Francis states that in 2007, the Chinese Eximbank provided Sri Lanka with a 307 million USD loan at a high interest rate of 6.3 percent for port development. Despite this, the project, managed by China Harbour Engineering Group (CHEG), was rushed to completion by then-president Rajapaksa for inauguration in 2010. However, the port faced commercial difficulties. Undeterred, Rajapaksa pursued the project’s expansion, and in 2012, Sri Lanka borrowed an additional 757 million USD from Eximbank, this time at a more affordable 2 percent interest rate. Later the debate revolved around ownership of the port effectively ceded to Chinese control as Sri-Lanka could no longer pay back the loan.  

However, the debt trap narrative has come under scrutiny. The report also emphasized that researchers were unable to discern any Chinese intention to burden borrowing countries with debt to acquire strategic assets in any case. China seemingly leveraged pre-existing relationships with politicians from other states to its advantage, a tactic that any other country might employ. Consequently, the researcher believed that China did not enter relationships with borrowing countries with malicious intentions. Instead, it opportunistically extended its influence. An article published in The Atlantic in February titled “The Chinese ‘Debt Trap’ Is a Myth clearly states that the narrative wrongfully portrays both Beijing and the developing countries. Further debt trap narrative surrounding the Hambantota Port project contains several misconceptions according to a report “Debunking the Myth of Debt-trap Diplomacy” published in Chatham House. The report states that the project challenges some common misunderstandings that was started by the Sri Lankan government, not China, for business reasons and faced issues due to mismanagement. It was part of a questionable development plan that caused surplus capacity. Sri Lanka’s debt problems were not caused by Chinese loans but by borrowing too much elsewhere and economic issues at home. Contrary to claims of swapping debt for assets, a Chinese company leased the port, and the money was used to pay off other debts. Chinese navy vessels can’t use the port, and it will be used by Sri Lanka’s own navy. These problems weren’t part of a well-thought-out strategy but emerged from earlier issues in the project.

These narratives continue to be major discourse when it comes to BRI flagship in Nepal. The question is how Nepal can use BRI for growth and where does Nepal locate itself in the context of such worrying developmental support. 

Locating Nepal Under BRI Flagship 

Nepal signed Memorandum of Understanding with China to participate in the BRI on May 12, 2017. According to a news report, ‘Nepal trims projects under BRI from 35 to 9 at Chinese call’ published in The Kathmandu Post, Nepal had identified the list of 35 projects to negotiate with China to be undertaken under BRI in 2019 that includes infrastructure development, energy, free trade area and irrigation among others with estimated investment around US$ 10 billion but Chinese side advised to prioritising the project led to trimming to the list to nine projects. 

Nine projects 

  • Upgradation of Rasuwagadhi-Kathmandu road
  • Kimathanka-Hile road construction
  • Dipayal to south border with China
  • Tokha-Bidur road
  • Galchhi-Rasuwagadhi-Kerung 400kv transmission line
  • Keyrung-Kathmandu rail (feasibility study)
  • Tamor hydroelectricity project (762MW)
  • Phukot Karnali Hydro Electric Project (426MW)

Source: https://kathmandupost.com/national/2019/01/18/nepal-trims-projects-under-bri-from-35-to-9-at-chinese-call

However, the progress has been slow towards implementing the envisaged project activities. Despite such announced project activities, the third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held in 2023, has enlisted the Panda Pack Project and Amity Living Water under the People’s Livelihood and People-to-people Connectivity projects

A report titled “Nepal’s BRI-shaped dilemma,” published by the Observer Research Foundation, a policy think tank in India, quotes Chinese representatives asserting that projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) extend beyond the initially identified nine. Noteworthy examples include the Gautam Buddha International Airport, funded by the Asian Development Bank, where Chinese contractors have been involved. Additionally, two other projects, the Tribhuvan International Airport in Kathmandu and the Pokhara Airport, are mentioned, funded by Chinese loans and executed by Chinese companies. In April 2022, Chinese Ambassador Hou Yanqi highlighted that the BRI is based on a cooperative modality involving grants and commercial cooperation. The report emphasizes that projects under the BRI in Nepal operate with three modalities. Furthermore, in June 2023 Chinese Ambassador Chen Song’s also asserted that the Pokhara Airport falls within the BRI framework, which led to consternation to Nepali officials.

Nepali officials rejected such claims and states that BRI implementation plan is still under consideration. Nepal defines the BRI as a project-specific initiative, focusing only on the initially listed projects. The country raises concerns about the strategic nature of some provisions and the inclusion of security elements in the initiative.

The signing of the BRI implementation plan has encountered uncertainties, as Nepal evaluates its internal and external financial pressures. The draft, titled “Implementation Plan on Jointly Building the Belt and Road Initiative between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of Nepal,” is presently undergoing redrafting and processing within the National Planning Commission (NPC). While the signing of the implementation plan was anticipated during Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s visit to China in September 2023, it could not be concluded.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) continues to be a source of contention in Nepal’s pursuit of infrastructure development. The discourse surrounding the BRI flagship in Nepal primarily revolves around concerns related to security and the potential debt trap. It is crucial for Nepal to exercise vigilance and careful consideration in navigating these issues. Despite Nepali leaders emphasizing the BRI as solely an infrastructure project with a preference for grants over loans, the implementation plan, even after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), is still under consideration.

Contrary to the claims made by Nepali officials, there is a disparity between the Chinese officials’ public remarks and the actual evidence of BRI projects. While Chinese officials suggest an expansive framework that includes grants and commercial cooperation, such as infrastructure construction by Chinese contractors and construction through loans from international agencies but contracted by Chinese contractors, the evidence on the ground presents a different picture. The third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 2023 has put the Panda Pack Project and Amity Living Water, categorized under People’s Livelihood and People-to-people Connectivity projects, do not align with the projects Nepal has been pursuing under BRI.

This inconsistency between the statements made by Chinese officials and the documented evidence of BRI projects raises concerns about the transparency of the flagship initiative. It underscores the need for a clearer understanding and communication between the involved parties to ensure the successful and mutually beneficial implementation of infrastructure projects in Nepal under the Belt and Road Initiative.